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Essay 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the Relationship Between 
Leagues and Players: Insights and Implications 
MICHAEL A. MCCANN 
 
This Essay examines U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 
important role in shaping U.S. sports law.  As a judge on the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York and later on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Sotomayor authored opinions that resolved 
two major sports law disputes: whether Major League Baseball owners 
could unilaterally impose new labor conditions on players during the 1994 
baseball strike and whether Ohio State University sophomore Maurice 
Clarett was obligated to wait three years from the completion of high 
school to become eligible for the National Football League draft. 
Although some critics of Justice Sotomayor charge that she sacrifices 
traditional legal analysis in order to advance progressive ideals, her views 
on the relationship between leagues and players appear far more 
conventional, if not rigid.  This conclusion furnishes insight on how she 
might assess two emerging sports law disputes: whether the National 
Basketball Association’s eligibility restriction violates section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and whether the National Football League 
comprises a single entity.  The latter dispute is the subject of American 
Needle v. National Football League, oral arguments for which were heard 
by Justice Sotomayor and other Supreme Court Justices in January 2010. 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the Relationship Between 
Leagues and Players: Insights and Implications 
MICHAEL A. MCCANN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When President Barack Obama nominated Sonia Sotomayor to 
succeed retiring Justice David Souter on the United States Supreme Court, 
politicians and commentators vigorously debated her judicial philosophy.  
They poured through Justice Sotomayor’s opinions, speeches, and other 
writings, examining and sometimes cherry-picking her words and 
expressions.  Competing sets of beliefs, ideas, and attitudes have been 
offered to explain Justice Sotomayor’s legal reasoning. 
Critics of Justice Sotomayor have championed an alleged weakness: 
she crafts her opinions to advance progressive agendas, with wavering 
adherence to actual law.1  Proponents of this viewpoint cite President 
Obama’s comment that he selected Justice Sotomayor partly because of her 
“compassion,” with the insinuation, in their view, that she bends fixed 
rules in order to aid disadvantaged litigants.2  Still others chastise the 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; Legal Analyst and SI.com Columnist, 
Sports Illustrated; Co-founder, Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School.  I thank 
Vermont Law School for funding this project through a research grant, Patrick Malloy for his excellent 
research assistance, and terrific comments from Nathanial Grow and Marc Edelman.  As a disclosure, I 
served as counsel to Maurice Clarett in his lawsuit against the National Football League and its 
eligibility rule.  See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held against Clarett, with then-Judge Sotomayor writing the opinion. 
1 See, e.g., George F. Will, Identity Justice: Obama’s Conventional Choice, WASH. POST, May 
27, 2009, at A19 (contending that Justice Sotomayor utilizes “identity politics, including the idea of 
categorical representation:  A person is what his or her race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference is, 
and members of a particular category can be represented—understood, empathized with—only by 
persons of the same identity.”); Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast June 7, 2009) (quoting 
former U.S. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich as stating, “In article after article and speech after 
speech, [Sotomayor] has said policy should be made by the court, the court should radically rewrite 
legislation and modernize the Constitution, judges have to intervene on social policy.”); Anthony Dick, 
Sotomayor’s Empathy: Beyond Race, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 3, 2009, http://bench. 
nationalreview.com/post/?q=OGRmYzM5OWNkMzE5MWEzYTE0MTRiOTEzNDhmZDA4NGY= 
(questioning Justice Sotomayor’s commitment to conventional legal application in Bartlett v. New York 
State Board of Law Examiners, 226 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000), where Sotomayor reasoned that in order to 
ascertain the “true abilities and knowledge” of a bar applicant who was unable to read well due to a 
learning disability, she was entitled to twice as much time to take the bar exam). 
2 See Terry Eastland, The Problem with Judicial Empathy, WKLY. STANDARD, June 8, 2009 
(“Compassion, as Obama sees it, that will lead the judge to reach the right (which is to say the left) 
result.”); Thomas Sowell, Sotomayor: “Empathy” in Action, TOWNHALL.COM, May 27, 2009, 
http://townhall.com/columnists/ThomasSowell/2009/05/27/sotomayor__empathy_in_action (“Barack 
Obama’s repeated claim that a Supreme Court justice should have ‘empathy’ with various groups has 
raised red flags . . . .”). 
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quality of her logic as overlooking or obscuring substantive legal issues.3  
At their core, these criticisms attempt to impugn Justice Sotomayor as unfit 
for the Court. 
As this Essay explores in Parts II and III, such criticisms are countered 
by Justice Sotomayor’s role in resolving two notable sports law disputes.  
In assessing whether Major League Baseball (“MLB”) owners could 
unilaterally impose new labor conditions on MLB players during the 1994 
baseball strike4 and whether Ohio State University sophomore Maurice 
Clarett was obligated to wait three years from the completion of high 
school to become eligible for the National Football League (“NFL”) draft,5 
Justice Sotomayor invoked traditional, arguably inflexible, applications of 
federal labor law.  In fact, from the lens of each case’s least-advantaged 
party, her opinions may have seemed bereft of “compassion”: 
economically-disadvantaged MLB teams were denied more equality in 
competing for high-priced players, and a twenty-year-old who was 
ineligible to return to college football and who unquestionably attracted the 
interests of NFL teams was denied the chance to capitalize on his talents. 
Part IV examines how Justice Sotomayor’s opinions in Silverman v. 
Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee and Clarett v. NFL 
are revealing, not only because they undermine a leading critique of her 
nomination, but because they also suggest how she, as a Justice, might 
assess two emerging sports law disputes of relative importance. 
First, an amateur basketball player could file a lawsuit against the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) claiming that its eligibility 
requirement, which since 2006 has required that U.S. players be at least 
nineteen years old and one year removed from high school,6 violates 
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.7  There are persistent rumors of 
such litigation arising, particularly as the NBA seeks to raise the eligibility 
rule to twenty years of age and two years removed from high school.8  
                                                                                                                          
3 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Case Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 2009, 
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=45d56e6f-f497-4b19-9c63-04e10199a085 (“[Sotomayor’s] 
opinions, although competent, are viewed by former prosecutors as not especially clean or tight, and 
sometimes miss the forest for the trees.”). 
4 Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 250–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
5 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League (Clarett II), 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
6 See NBA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 1 (2005).  From 1976 to 2005, any 
amateur player could declare his intention to be eligible for the NBA Draft, provided both his high 
school class had graduated and he had made his declaration within forty-five days of the NBA Draft.  
See NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 5(a) (1999). 
7 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing in pertinent part:  “Every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
8 Howard Beck, From Preps to the Pinnacle of the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B15; 
Zach Lowe, The Jim Calhoun Chronicles: Text Messages, Age Limits, and Misspelling Your Lawyer’s 
Name, AM. L. DAILY, Mar. 30, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/03/the-jim-
calhoun.html. 
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Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Clarett would prove consequential, if not 
determinative, in such a case.  Moreover, should a circuit split emerge on 
age limits in professional sports—a distinct possibility—the Supreme 
Court would be poised to resolve the matter.  Justice Sotomayor could 
once again influence the legal capacity of eighteen-year-old athletes who 
seek to play professional sports. 
Even more meaningful, Sotomayor could impact how antitrust law 
regulates professional sports leagues.  In its October 2009 term, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reviewed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit’s recent decision in American Needle v. National Football League.9  
At its core, American Needle concerns whether professional sports leagues 
are “single entities,” a status that would effectively immunize them from 
constraining requirements of federal antitrust law.10  As Part IV discusses, 
Justice Sotomayor’s skepticism of unilateral league maneuvers, but 
pragmatic deference for league operations, present a mixed bag for 
professional sports leagues and their ambitions to escape antitrust scrutiny. 
II.  CONCEPTIONS OF LABOR RIGHTS FOR LEAGUES, TEAMS, AND PLAYERS 
Justice Sotomayor clearly values the sanctity of collectively-bargained 
terms between professional sports leagues and their respective players’ 
associations.  These terms are agreed upon by both franchise owners and 
players and are contained in their collective bargaining agreements 
(“CBAs”), which, inter alia, regulate the so-called “mandatory subjects of 
bargaining”—players’ wages, hours, and other employment conditions.11  
The non-statutory labor exemption encourages owners to collectively-
bargain, rather than to unilaterally impose rules implicating these 
mandatory subjects: the exemption furnishes antitrust immunity for 
bargained terms if those terms concern mandatory subjects and primarily 
affect the owners and players.12  There is no such exemption for 
unilaterally-imposed rules, or those rules that implicate non-mandatory 
subjects or primarily affect third parties.13  The non-statutory labor 
                                                                                                                          
9 Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).  On June 29, 2009, the 
U.S. Supreme Court announced that it granted review of American Needle.  Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 
08-661).  On January 13, 2010, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in this case.  See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, No. 08-661 (U.S. argued Jan. 13, 2010). 
10 Am. Needle Inc., 538 F.3d at 740. 
11 See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League (Clarett I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
12 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235–38 (1996) (explaining that it would be 
difficult and illogical to exclude all “competition-restricting agreements” from collective bargaining). 
13 Leagues enjoy other limited exemptions from antitrust law, including the Sports Broadcasting 
Act of 1961, which grants MLB, NFL, NBA, and the NHL an exemption for the negotiation of 
television contracts.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports 
League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 468–71 (1990).  MLB also has a limited 
exemption from antitrust laws stemming from Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922), premised on baseball’s historic role 
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exemption embodies a well-established federal policy that employees are 
better off negotiating together than individually.14 
In Silverman, then-Judge Sotomayor, presiding on the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, effectively rejected a new set 
of employment terms that MLB had unilaterally imposed.15  The terms, 
which would have curbed player salaries, were designed to 
disproportionately benefit “small market,” revenue-disadvantaged 
franchises, such as the Pittsburgh Pirates and the Kansas City Royals.16  In 
the modern era of high-priced players, these teams usually struggle to 
compete with the more prosperous clubs, such as the New York Yankees 
or the Boston Red Sox.17  Applying a conventional interpretation of labor 
law, Sotomayor characterized the terms as incompatible with language for 
which MLB and the Major League Baseball Players’ Association 
(“MLBPA”) had bargained.  Notably, her opinion sidestepped discussion 
of the plight of small market clubs and their fans or, for that matter, the 
plight of low-paid players who were set to replace the strikers.  Indeed, it 
stuck firmly to the letter of the law and refrained from the kinds of 
subjective considerations that rile her contemporary critics. 
Silverman occurred after the MLB CBA had expired and while 
baseball players were on strike from August 1994 to April 1995.18  During 
this time, MLB and the MLBPA attempted to negotiate a new CBA, which 
would have ended the strike.  Frustrated by contentious negotiations, MLB 
                                                                                                                          
as the U.S. pastime.  In 1998, MLB’s limited exemption was substantially narrowed by federal 
legislation.  See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006).  Issues between MLB and MLBPA 
were excluded from the exemption.  Id. 
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (indicating that the Norris-LaGuardia Act favors the organization 
of labor); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952) (explaining that 
prior to the National Labor Relations Act, courts obligated employers to negotiate with employee 
representatives); Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Wagner to First National 
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1478 (1982) (discussing the 
empowerment of bargaining units to represent individual employees as a collective entity). 
15 Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 261 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
16 See Tim Brown, Bare Markets, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at D1. 
17 See RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMISSIONER’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICS 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf (finding that payrolls are correlated with 
winning); Bryan Day, Labor Pains: Why Contraction Is Not the Solution to Major League Baseball’s 
Competitive Balance Problems, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 521, 536 (2002) (“The 
correlation between team win percentage and team payroll has been significant at the highest statistical 
level every year between 1995 and 2001.”); Michael Lewis, Individual Team Incentives and Managing 
Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues: An Empirical Analysis of Major League Baseball, 45 J. MKTG. 
RES. 535, 543–44 (2008) (identifying empirical support for the proposition that market size exerts a 
significant effect on team payrolls, with larger market teams being able to afford higher payrolls); 
Frederick Wiseman & Sangit Chatterjee, Team Payroll and Team Performance in Major League 
Baseball: 1985–2002, 1 ECON. BULL. 1, 3 (2003) (finding that team success is statistically more likely 
with higher payrolls). 
18 Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 251–52; see also William B. Gould IV, The 1994–‘95 Baseball 
Strike and the National Labor Relations Board: To the Precipice and Back Again, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 
983, 983 (2008) (supplying a detailed account of Silverman and its underlying facts). 
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unilaterally imposed, and then rescinded, a salary cap on teams’ payrolls.  
MLB then notified the MLBPA that the league, as opposed to individual 
teams, would negotiate free agent player contracts—meaning that players 
would be unable to induce multiple teams to compete for their services.  
MLB also announced that player arbitration rights were eliminated, thereby 
removing third-party involvement in salary disputes between players and 
teams.19  MLB viewed these new conditions as crucial to preserving its 
long-term viability, particularly the viability of small market clubs. 
The MLBPA, however, rejected the conditions on both policy grounds 
and legal grounds.  From a policy standpoint, the conditions would have 
restrained salaries in future player contracts and diminished the capacity of 
free agent players to select their employers.20  Legally, the conditions 
would have altered existing contracts between players and teams, an 
outcome prohibited by the expired CBA and arguably constitutive of unfair 
labor practices.21 
In granting an injunction in favor of the MLBPA, then-Judge 
Sotomayor prevented baseball owners from unilaterally achieving their 
goal.  She reasoned that since the owners and players continued to bargain 
in good faith, the expired CBA remained in effect, and its terms remained 
operative.22  Moreover, Sotomayor declined to embrace MLB’s creative 
characterizations of the unilaterally-imposed conditions as permissive 
subjects of bargaining.  Instead, she applied the traditional meaning of 
                                                                                                                          
19 See Marc Chalpin, It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over: The Century Long Conflict Between the Owners 
and the Players in Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REV. 205, 218 (1996) (“Perhaps the most 
important victory for the players in the 1973 Basic Agreement was the institution of salary arbitration.  
If a player met the eligibility requirements, and he could not reach an agreement with his team owner, 
an outside arbitrator would resolve the dispute.”). 
20 Through collective bargaining, the MLBPA fought to obtain free agency and to secure the 
abolition of the “reserve clause” system.  Under this system, which dominated baseball from the 1880s 
to the 1970s, MLB teams could re-sign any player to a one-year contract; a player could only become a 
free agent if a team let him.  As a result, players could not readily move from one team to another in 
search of higher wages.  See J. Gordon Hylton, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 391, 391–92 (1999) (“It seems quite likely . . . that the players would have 
eventually have secured significant modifications, if not outright termination, of the reserve system 
without either the Flood lawsuit . . . or the Curt Flood Act.”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Affirmative 
Injunctions in Athletic Employment Contracts: Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American 
Sports Law, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 278–79 (2006) (discussing efforts by MLB players to 
challenge the reserve clause). 
21 See Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 259 (“[Judge Sotomayor found] that returning the parties to the 
status quo [would] permit them to salvage some of the important bargaining equality that existed before 
the February 6 unfair labor practices were committed.”). 
22 Id. at 253.  Sotomayor’s reasoning was based on precedent: the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that expired CBAs remain in effect unless the parties reach a new agreement or the parties bargain in 
good faith to impasse.  See, e.g., Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete 
Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.6 (1988).  Here, the parties continued to negotiate after expiration of the CBA, 
thus precluding a finding of an impasse, which is “that point at which the parties have exhausted the 
prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless.”  Id. at 543 n.5. 
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employment conditions.23  Justice Sotomayor’s decision placed the players 
and owners in the same position they were in before the strike began.  With 
their leverage lost, the owners dropped their ambitious bargaining goals 
and the strike ended four days later.24 
Although fans expressed contempt for both the owners and players, 
commentators generally regarded the MLBPA as the strike’s victor.25  It 
dodged most of MLB’s demands, and though it agreed to a “luxury tax” 
(which taxed the teams with the highest payrolls and redistributed those 
funds to small market teams), the tax would have little effect on players’ 
earning power.26  Player salaries, in fact, would increase 8.5% and 14.2%, 
respectively, in the following two seasons.27  The tax also failed to achieve 
its progressive purpose, as teams with relatively high payrolls—most 
notably the Red Sox, Yankees, and Dodgers—continued to lavishly pay 
players, while those teams with the smallest payrolls remained unlikely 
suitors for stars.28 
Interestingly, Sotomayor was portrayed as most victorious.  She 
received considerable praise from sports fans and journalists for having 
restored the national pastime, with a Philadelphia Inquirer columnist going 
so far as to place her contributions on par with those of Jackie Robinson, 
Joe DiMaggio, Ted Williams, and other Hall of Fame players.29 
Yet in the aftermath of Justice Sotomayor’s decision, the underlying 
policy implications of a “more level playing field” for MLB franchises 
would not see their day in court or on the field.  Indeed, without 
significantly changed labor conditions, player salaries and team payroll 
                                                                                                                          
23 See Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 259 (“[T]his strike is about more than just whether the Players 
and Owners will resolve their differences.  It is also about how the principles embodied by federal labor 
law operate.”); Chalpin, supra note 19, at 233 (describing MLB’s actions as “clearly inconsistent with 
federal labor laws”); Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and 
the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 524–25 n.18 (citing Silverman as the paradigmatic case 
of labor law used to regulate unilateral action by owners). 
24 See Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Quit Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at A1. 
25 See, e.g., Jeffrey Simpson, The Baseball Owners Won Nothing, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Apr. 5, 
1995 (opining that the owners were defeated “on all fronts”). 
26 See Dan Messeloff, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 
NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 521, 
562–63 (2000) (discussing criticisms of the luxury tax); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the 
Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 937–38 n.296 (1999) (explaining the 
mechanics and significant limitations of the luxury tax); Bob Nightengale, Peace at Last, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 1996, at C1 (providing details on the 1996 MLB-MLBPA collective bargaining agreement 
and the luxury tax). 
27 See MARK CONRAD, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 121 (2006). 
28 For commentary on the luxury tax, see LEVIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 39; Eric Fisher, Yankees, 
Braves Set MLB’s Tone, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at A5; Bill Madden, Padres Rebuilding Once 
Again, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 17, 1999, at 105. 
29 See Bruce Jenkins, A’s, Giants Will Finish Atop Divisions, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 1995, at B1 
(noting that “[s]till the most heroic name in baseball until further notice: Sonia Sotomayor”); Claude 
Lewis, Strike Isn’t Enough to Sour Fans’ Affair with Baseball, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 6, 1995, 
at 25A. 
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disparities would only grow.30  Consequently, as some had feared, these 
disparities would eventually impair small market franchises.  The Montreal 
Expos, in fact, essentially ran out of money in 2002, requiring the league to 
purchase them.31  Montreal no longer has an MLB franchise. 
The strike’s resolution also emboldened the MLBPA, supplying it with 
the confidence to repel subsequent attempts by owners to institute a salary 
cap.32  This confidence may not always have benefited the players or the 
game itself.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the MLBPA resisted 
owners’ calls for stricter drug testing policies—policies that may have 
mitigated the now infamous steroids scandal and dissuaded Congress from 
holding hearings, which irreparably tarnished several players’ careers.33  
To this day, baseball remains under a cloud of suspicion as to which 
players used steroids.34  Similarly, many of the impressive records 
achieved over the last ten to fifteen years—most notably Barry Bonds 
setting the all-time home run record—will be discounted, if not outright 
ignored, by future generations. 
To be clear, Justice Sotomayor should not draw blame for baseball’s 
assorted woes; there are numerous causes and culprits from within and 
around the game.  More importantly, she merely applied the law in 
Silverman as it was conventionally understood.  Indeed, far from the 
radical jurist some now portray her as, Justice Sotomayor, for good or bad, 
seemed anything but radical. 
III.  CONCEPTIONS OF LABOR RIGHTS FOR EXISTING PLAYERS                  
AND PROSPECTIVE PLAYERS 
Justice Sotomayor’s approach to Clarett v. NFL offers concurring 
themes, as she likewise exhibited a preference for unbending applications 
of labor law over seemingly more “compassionate” ones. 
                                                                                                                          
30 See Joe Lemire, SI Players: Life on and off the Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 20, 2009, at 
19 (noting that the total annual payroll of MLB players tripled from 1994 to 2009); Wiseman & 
Chatterjee, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining that the “growing disparity” in team payrolls will hurt the 
competitive balance of the game); BizOfBaseball.com, Average Salary 1967–2007, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=563&Itemid=42 (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2010) (displaying how the average MLB salary increased from $1.2 million in 1994 to 
$2.7 million in 2006). 
31 See David Schoenfield, Still 30 Teams: Contraction Timeline, ESPN, Feb. 5, 2002, 
http://assets.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2002/0205/1323230.html (detailing MLB’s response to the assorted 
financial issues faced by the Montreal Expos between 2001 and 2002). 
32 See Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 747, 753–55 
(2009) (discussing MLB’s collective bargaining efforts over the last fifteen years). 
33 See David K. Osei, Note, Doping, Juicing, and Executive Bypass Oversight: A Case Study of 
Major League Baseball’s Steroid Scandal, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 155, 168–69 (2004) (discussing 
the “singular goal” of the MLPBA to prevent enhanced testing for steroids). 
34 See Michael McCann, Will Steroids Report Lead to Perjury Investigation of Sammy Sosa?, 
SI.COM, June 16, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/michael_mccann/06/16/sammy. 
sosa/index.html?eref=sihpT1 (describing a supposedly confidential list of 104 names of MLB players 
who tested positive for steroids in 2003 and how the list may be publicly revealed over time). 
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Clarett centered on Maurice Clarett, who in 2004 argued that the 
NFL’s eligibility requirement, which requires that at least three years pass 
from when an amateur player graduated from high school and the NFL 
draft, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.35  Section 1 prohibits 
unreasonable restraints of trade, which courts have defined to include 
unilaterally-imposed barriers on entry to professional sports leagues.36  
Then-Judge Sotomayor, as a member of a three-judge panel on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote a much-publicized opinion 
in favor of the NFL.  The decision reversed a similarly noteworthy opinion 
from Judge Shira Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.37 
Clarett embodied an intriguing and somewhat emblematic plaintiff.  
Similar to some other star athletes, Clarett experienced challenging life 
circumstances as a child and young adult.38  His football prowess enabled 
him to matriculate at Ohio State University, where as a freshman he led the 
Buckeyes to a national championship, while receiving numerous individual 
awards.39 
Clarett’s success was not lost on the Ohio State community, as his 
jersey became a top selling item.40  As a National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”) student-athlete, however, Clarett could not receive 
compensation from any of the sales, nor could he obtain compensation for 
the increased ticket revenue and enhanced television ratings for games in 
which he starred.  His “compensation” was instead limited to tuition, room, 
board, books, and restricted other expenses.41  Clarett found this 
arrangement to be particularly disagreeable when he could not afford a 
plane ticket to fly from California—where he was playing a game for Ohio 
State—to Ohio to attend a close friend’s funeral.42 
As a sophomore, Clarett sought to enter the NFL, where he would have 
been paid millions of dollars for the same football services that he was 
providing Ohio State.  The NFL’s eligibility rule, however, prevented him 
                                                                                                                          
35 Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). 
36 See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc. 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 
(invalidating the NBA’s unilaterally-imposed age restriction); Boris v. U.S. Football League, 1984-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) P 66,012, 68,463 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (invalidating the USFL’s unilaterally-imposed 
age restriction). 
37 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
38 See Rob Oller, On the Run and in Control, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 2002, at 1A. 
39 See Bruce Lowitt, Buckeyes Running Back in a Big Hurry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2002, at 1C; Austin Murphy, Mighty Mo: Precocious Freshman Tailback Maurice Clarett Made His 
Presence Felt—On and off the Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 15, 2003, at 12. 
40 See Mike Pramik, Ohio State Halts Sale of Clarett Jerseys, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 
2003, at 1B (noting that Clarett jerseys “were flying off the racks” at on- and off-campus retail stores). 
41 See NYCCA bylaw § 15.1, reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 
NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL (2009). 
42 See William C. Rhoden, Paying the Price While Coaches Cash In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at 
D2.  For additional background and sources on Clarett, see Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, 
Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 740–42 (2006). 
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from doing so.  Per the rule, NFL teams agree to boycott any candidate, 
regardless of his talent, skill, or financial need, solely on the basis of time 
elapsed from high school.43  Proponents of the rule, including the NFL, 
highlight safety and maturity concerns about young players;44 opponents 
charge that the rule is inefficiently bright-line and supplies the NFL with a 
free minor league system: NCAA football.45 
As a point of context, the NFL was the only major male professional 
sports league that prohibited players from entrance until a prescribed 
period after high school graduation.46  MLB, the National Hockey League 
(“NHL”), NASCAR, professional tennis, professional golf, and 
professional boxing had, and have, no such rules.47  Players in those 
leagues or professional sports are eligible to play immediately after high 
school, if not well before that point in time—much like professional actors 
and musicians can hone their craft while being lucratively compensated.48  
The same was true of NBA players until 2006.49 
Clarett and the NFL debated whether the rule had been bargained, with 
Sotomayor concluding that it was.50  Even if the rule was bargained, 
Clarett asserted, bargained terms between the NFL and National Football 
                                                                                                                          
43 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006–2012, art. XVI, § 2(b) (2006) (“No player 
shall be . . . eligib[le] for . . . the Draft, until three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended 
following either his graduation from high school or graduation of the class with which he entered high 
school, whichever is earlier.”). 
44 McCann & Rosen, supra note 42, at 732 (“The NFL age eligibility rule is premised on . . . core 
beliefs about all players who fail to satisfy it . . . [because] they lack the requisite mental or physical 
maturity . . . [and] they are uniquely prone to injury . . . .”). 
45 See id. at 748. 
46 Since 1998, the Women’s National Basketball Association (“WNBA”) has required that its 
players be twenty-two years old and graduates of four-year colleges.  Marc Edelman & C. Keith 
Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical 
Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 11–12 
(2008). 
47 In MLB, for instance, players can be drafted immediately after completing high school.  They 
can elect to sign with an MLB organization at that time, or attend either a four-year college (in which 
case they must complete their junior year of college, or be at least twenty-one years old, before they 
become eligible again for the MLB draft) or a junior college (in which case they are eligible for the 
MLB draft again after one year).  Importantly, they possess the choice to play for an MLB organization 
right out of high school.  See Major League Baseball First-Year Player Draft Official Rules, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).  Some of the top players drafted 
out of high school can sign for enormous amounts of money.  See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Solving 
Problems in the Player Representation Business: Unions Should Be the “Exclusive” Representatives of 
the Players, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 737, 753 n.66 (2006) (noting that eighteen-year-old Justin Upton, 
the first overall pick of the 2005 MLB draft, signed a $6.1 million contract). 
48 Consider that Amanda Bynes, Dakota Fanning, Daniel Radcliffe, and Mary-Kate and Ashley 
Olsen all earned millions of dollars in acting before they turned eighteen.  So Young, Yet So Rich, 
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 28, 2007, at 13. 
49 For a full discussion, see infra Part IV.A. 
50 Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2004); see also McCann & Rosen, supra note 42, at 
743–44 (discussing that the Second Circuit held that the NFL’s eligibility rule “comprised a mandatory 
bargaining subject” because it governed initial employment, Clarett and similar players would have a 
“tangible effect” on the salaries of other players, and because “sufficient collective bargaining” had 
been established when the NFLPA agreed to waive challenges to the NFL bylaws). 
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League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) should not receive protection 
from the non-statutory labor exemption when they primarily concern 
persons who cannot, by definition of those terms, be members of the NFL 
or the NFLPA.51 
After all, as merely a prospective NFL player, Clarett had no formal 
suasion over the eligibility rule.  Plus, Clarett’s mere presence in the seven-
round, 255-person selection draft would seemingly have impacted only 
other prospective NFL players and most likely the very last player selected 
(i.e., “Mr. Irrelevant”),52 who presumably would not have been drafted.  
Indeed, whether or not Clarett was eligible, each team would still have 
drafted and signed the same number of players, who would have competed 
for jobs with existing NFL players and other prospective ones.  Along 
those lines, Clarett contended, the rule could not have primarily concerned 
the working conditions of NFL players since it was designed to render a 
class of potential NFL players unemployable.53 
The NFL, however, reasoned that unions and managements in other 
settings, including in professional sports, routinely bargain rules that deny 
entrance to prospective members.54  According to this logic, eligibility 
rules are among the bundle of employment rights that unions and 
management bargain over in pursuit of a CBA.  From that vantage point, 
eligibility rules should not be viewed in isolation, since their modification 
or elimination might alter assumptions underlying entire agreements.55 
The league also argued that its eligibility rule affected current players’ 
employment.  Namely, Clarett would have replaced the job of another 
player, presumably one with a different salary, and formulation of the 
league salary cap depends on aggregate salary.56 
Writing for the Second Circuit, then-Judge Sotomayor agreed with the 
NFL, holding—like she did in Silverman—that based on precedent, 
collectively-bargained terms between owners and players should receive 
the utmost deference.  This deference, according to Sotomayor, was 
premised on a longstanding and expansive judicial interpretation of what 
                                                                                                                          
51 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
52 For some background on the dignity and indignity that go along with being named “Mr. 
Irrelevant,” see Gary Swan, ‘Irrelevant’ Honor for 49er, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 12, 1996, at 
B3. 
53 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
54 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (citing Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective 
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1971), for the proposition that 
entry of new players impacts the salary structure of players already in the league); see also Robert 
Forbes, Note, Call on the Field Reversed: How the NFL Players Association Won Big on Salary 
Forfeiture at the Bargaining Table, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 333, 335–39 (2007) (explaining the 
NFL’s salary structure). 
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constitute conditions of employment.57  As a consequence, regardless of 
individual NFL teams desiring to hire Clarett, and regardless of Clarett’s 
desire to work for them, “the NFL and its players union [could] agree that 
an employee will not be hired or considered for employment for nearly any 
reason . . . .”58  That was true, Sotomayor conceded, even when the terms 
of exclusion unquestionably harm prospective players:  “[S]imply because 
the eligibility rules work a hardship on prospective rather than current 
employees does not render them impermissible.”59 
Clarett was thus excluded from the 2004 NFL draft.  He was also 
excluded from college football: following Judge Scheindlin’s earlier 
decision to declare him eligible for the 2004 draft, Clarett had signed with 
an agent, thereby forfeiting his remaining collegiate eligibility under 
NCAA rules (the NCAA refused to reinstate Clarett and a similarly 
situated player, Mike Williams of the University of Southern California, 
after the Second Circuit’s reversal).60  Clarett, therefore, had no place to 
play.  He elected to train for a year until he was eligible for the 2005 NFL 
draft, in which he was drafted by the Denver Broncos.  He reported to the 
Broncos’ training camp in questionable condition, however, and was 
subsequently cut.61  Without work, Clarett returned home to Youngstown, 
Ohio, where later he would be arrested for robbery and illegal possession 
of guns.  He is currently serving a seven-and-a-half year prison sentence 
and is eligible to be released from prison in February 2010.62 
To the extent “compassion” motivated Justice Sotomayor in her legal 
reasoning, it did not appear to benefit Clarett and similarly-situated 
players.  Indeed, as Professor Walter Champion observes, Sotomayor 
arguably seemed unmoved by Clarett’s plight while “seriously 
marginaliz[ing]” his legal arguments.63 
A similar deduction might be said of “fairness,” an equally subjective 
and evocative term which, as her critics note, Justice Sotomayor has 
                                                                                                                          
57 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 139–40; see also Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility 
Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
71, 104–05 (2008) (opining that then-Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in Clarett II was “consistent with 
general labor law principles providing a union with exclusive and plenary authority to negotiate all 
terms and conditions of its members’ employment, including restrictions and limits favoring existing 
workers”). 
58 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 141. 
59 Id. at 140. 
60 Clifton Brown, After Detour, Williams Finally Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at D7. 
61 Joe Drape, Gamble on Clarett Reveals Perils of Potential, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at D8. 
62 See Bruce Cadwallader, Clarett Asks To Get Out of Prison Early, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 
19, 2009, at 1C; see also Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Opinion, The Psychopathology of Athlete 
Worship, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/projo_ 
20060824_24hanso.2d59a11.html (providing details of Clarett’s legal woes). 
63 Walter T. Champion, Jr., Looking Back to Mackey v. NFL To Revive the Non-Statutory Labor 
Exemption in Professional Sports, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 103 (2008). 
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periodically highlighted as crucial in the application of law.64  Is fairness 
promoted by an interpretation of the non-statutory exemption that 
uniformly excludes otherwise draftable players from the draft?  Among 
others, Alan Milstein, who litigated on behalf of Clarett, believes it does 
not.  Although Milstein believes Sotomayor will make a very good Justice, 
he describes the Second Circuit’s decision as reflecting “almost knee-jerk 
approval” of the NFL’s construal of the non-statutory exemption.65  On the 
other hand, would fairness be jeopardized if players’ associations lost the 
capacity to negotiate eligibility restrictions among their bundle of rights?  
Some commentators have contemplated such a contention.66 
Intriguingly, Justice Sotomayor refrained from these types of 
considerations in Clarett.  Instead, she applied the law in a way consistent 
with her belief, and that of some other jurists, that collectively bargained 
terms can prohibit the entry of prospective employees into an organization.  
A radical imagination of the law it was not. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinions in Silverman and Clarett, as well as her 
putative presence on the Supreme Court, may also prove instructive from a 
prospective lens.  Specifically, they may influence the outcome of two 
unresolved sports law matters: whether leagues and players’ associations 
can bargain away employment opportunities for otherwise employable 
eighteen- and nineteen-year-old star athletes, and whether, in certain 
settings of collusive behavior, leagues and their independently-owned 
franchises may function as a single entity, thereby obtaining a complete 
exemption from section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.67 
A.  Eligibility for the NBA Draft 
Eligibility rules in professional sports remain controversial post-
                                                                                                                          
64 See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Sotomayor’s Aversion to Impartiality, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2009, at 
C28 (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s comment that that judges should “aspire to achieve a greater 
degree of fairness” in their decision making).  Fairness has also appeared in her opinions as a principle 
objective.  See, e.g., Jiang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 520 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“To further the goals of uniformity and fairness . . . .”); Kraham v. Lippman, 478 F.3d 502, 506 
(2d Cir. 2007) (“If, however, to ensure fairness . . . .”). 
65 Telephone Interview with Alan Milstein (May 26, 2009) (on file with author); see also Brando 
Simeo Starkey, The Veil of Fair Representation: Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, 37 U. 
BALT. L.F. 17, 28 (2006) (describing the NFL’s age limit as “conspicuously unfair”). 
66 See, e.g., Daniel A. Applegate, Comment, The NBA Gets a College Education: An Antitrust and 
Labor Analysis of the NBA’s Minimum Age Limit, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 830, 850–51 (2006) 
(arguing that “[a]llowing antitrust courts to intrude on the collective bargaining relationships ‘place[s] 
in jeopardy’” the right of players to bargain).  But see Michael Scheinkman, Comment, Running Out of 
Bounds: Over-Extending the Labor Antitrust Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 733, 767 (2005) (concluding that Sotomayor’s opinion in Clarett II set a “dangerous 
precedent” in tipping the scales of law “too far in favor of labor law”). 
67 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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Clarett.68  That is particularly true of the NBA’s rule, which the league 
collectively-bargained with the National Basketball Players’ Association 
(“NBPA”) in 2005.  The rule requires that U.S. players be at least nineteen 
years old by December 31 of the year of the draft and that they be one year 
removed from high school.69  More technically, by “one year removed,” at 
least one NBA season must pass from when the players graduated from 
high school or, if they failed to graduate, would have graduated.70  In 
contrast, international players, defined as those who maintain a permanent 
residence outside of the United States for at least three years preceding the 
draft, need only be nineteen years old by December 31 of the year of the 
draft.71  Prior to the 2006 draft, U.S. players were eligible for the draft 
immediately following their high school graduation.72 
The NBA’s eligibility rule may soon receive legislative and judicial 
scrutiny, especially as the league seeks to elevate the rule to twenty-years 
of age and two years removed from high school.73  The first layer of 
scrutiny appears to be in the halls of Congress.  In June 2009, U.S. 
Representative Steve Cohen formally requested that the NBA and NBPA 
repeal their eligibility rule.74  Observing the rule’s disproportionate impact 
on African Americans,75 Representative Cohen threatened to propose 
legislation that would prohibit professional sports leagues from barring 
players who have reached eighteen years of age.76 
There have also been rumblings of a legal challenge.77  A potential 
source of litigation concerns the rule’s uncertain application to non-
traditional student-athletes.  Consider, for instance, North Carolina native 
John Wall, the nation’s top-rated high school basketball prospect in 2009.78  
During the spring of 2009, Wall, a fifth-year high school student, 
contemplated declaring for the 2009 draft.79  Had he done so, the NBA 
could have rejected the declaration on grounds that Wall had failed to 
                                                                                                                          
68 Consider the attention the eligibility rules have attracted in legal scholarship.  Since 2005, 
twenty-one law review publications have contained the word “Clarett” in the title and seventy-six have 
addressed Clarett v. NFL.  In that same time span, twenty-one law review publications have discussed 
the NBA’s age eligibility rule.  I conducted the relevant searches on June 30, 2009.  I used the “US 
Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database on Lexis/Nexis. 
69 NBA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 6, art. X, § 1. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
73 Beck, supra note 8; Pete Thamel, Few High School Stars Expected To Follow European Detour 
to NBA, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at SP5. 
74 Pete Thamel, N.B.A. Is Asked To End Age Limit, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at B14. 
75 In the NBA’s history, forty-eight players attempted the jump from a U.S. high school to the 
NBA.  Forty-six were African American.  Data on file with author. 
76 Thamel, N.B.A., supra note 74. 
77 See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 8 (citing comments by sports litigator Alan Milstein). 
78 Calipari Lands Nation’s Top Prospect, TENNESSEAN, May 19, 2009, at Sports 1. 
79 The draft was held on June 25, 2009.  NBA Key Dates, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 14, 
2009, at 11C. 
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satisfy its eligibility rule.  Wall had met the nineteen-year-old age 
requirement, but due to assorted transfers between high schools, there was 
confusion as to when he “would have graduated” from high school.80  
Although some projected that he would have been among the first five 
players selected in the 2009 draft81—which would have meant securing a 
guaranteed contract worth at least $7.7 million over three years82—Wall 
instead accepted a scholarship to play at the University of Kentucky.83  His 
decision removed the possibility of a potential challenge to the eligibility 
rule, but revealed the type of fact pattern that could induce such a 
challenge.84 
Along those lines, and strictly for purposes of illustration, consider 
seventeen-year-old basketball phenom Jeremy Tyler of California.  Tyler’s 
talents have drawn extraordinary praise, with one retired NBA player 
musing, “[Tyler] has more upside than any player I’ve seen since LeBron 
[James]. . . . He’s one of those guys who comes along once in a lifetime.”85  
Tyler recently announced that he will skip his senior year of high school to 
play professionally in Israel.86  A basketball player turning pro after his 
junior year of high school is unprecedented—at least among U.S. players,87 
as many international basketball players turn pro at fourteen or fifteen 
                                                                                                                          
80 Roger Van Der Horst, NBA Option for Wall?, NEWS & OBSERVER (N.C.), Apr. 16, 2009, 
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/high_school/story/86503.html. 
81 See id. (citing comments by Sonny Vaccaro, a former basketball coach, scout, and marketing 
executive).  Vaccaro is also an advocate for players having the ability to matriculate directly to the 
NBA out of high school.  See Kurt Streeter, Shoe’s on the Other Foot for Vaccaro, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2009, at D1. 
82 Id. 
83 Jim Halley & Jeff Zillgitt, Calipari Puts Together a ‘Remarkable Class,’ USA TODAY, May 20, 
2009, at 10C. 
84 The prospect of such a challenge attracted considerable media coverage.  See, e.g., Van Der 
Horst, supra note 80 (noting that Wall’s recruitment has been “followed as closely as a slow dump 
truck on I-440”); Gary Parrish, Don’t Eliminate the Wall-to-NBA Talk Just Yet, CBS SPORTS, Apr. 15, 
2009, http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/6271764/14538408 (surmising that the ambiguity of 
the NBA’s age eligibility rule may motivate Wall to seek entrance into the NBA out of high school). 
85 Pete Thamel, Going His Own Way on Little-Traveled Route, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at SP1 
(citing remarks by Olden Polynice, who played in the NBA for fifteen years). 
86 Pete Thamel, Prep Star Signs with Team in Israel’s Top League, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at 
B16; see also Chris Ballard, Study Abroad: Hoops Major, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 4, 2009, at 76 
(discussing Tyler’s decisionmaking process). 
87 Keep in mind that Tyler is not the first U.S. player to take an unconventional path through 
Europe before entering the NBA.  In 2008, Brandon Jennings, whose eligibility for college was 
uncertain for academic reasons, chose to play professionally in Italy for one year, where he earned $1.2 
million.  Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A, Via Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1.  
He was drafted tenth overall by the Milwaukee Bucks in the 2009 NBA draft and  signed a guaranteed 
contract worth at least $3.8 million over two years.  The Day in Sports, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at 
C8.  Female players have also pursued professional opportunities in Europe prior to eligibility in the 
WNBA.  Epiphanny Prince, for example, skipped her senior season to play professional basketball in 
Europe before entering the 2010 WNBA draft.  Greg Bishop, Female Star Leaves U.S. To Turn Pro in 
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at B11. 
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years of age.88  It is expected that Tyler will spend two years abroad, after 
which he will be eligible for the 2011 NBA draft. 
One intriguing possibility is if Tyler were to earn his General 
Equivalency Diploma (“GED”) before the completion of the 2009–10 
NBA season and then sought to enter the 2010 NBA draft, at which point 
he would have satisfied the nineteen-year-old age requirement.89  Tyler 
would be poised to earn considerably more in the NBA than in Israel90 and 
would be one year closer to free agency as an NBA player.91  In addition, 
though his previous U.S. high school class would not have graduated yet, 
Tyler would have already obtained the equivalent of a high school diploma 
and at least a portion of one NBA season would have passed from his 
earning of a GED and the 2010 draft. 
The NBA’s eligibility rule is silent both on whether a GED would 
fulfill the requirement that the player have graduated from high school and 
whether a portion of an NBA season would satisfy the “one year removed” 
requirement.92  If the NBA interpreted the rule to preclude Tyler’s entry—
which it would be poised to do, given resulting incentives for other high 
school players93—Tyler could file a lawsuit challenging the NBA’s 
application of the rule. 
Tyler’s claim, however, would likely encounter a standard of review 
favorable to the NBA.  Courts normally apply the highly deferential 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard to league interpretation of procedural 
rules.94  Then again, such a standard has concerned disputes involving 
players in the league; no prospective player has historically challenged a 
                                                                                                                          
88 See, e.g., Jonathan Abrams, Rubio Has No Concerns, Even if Some Others Do, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 25, 2009, at B13 (noting that Ricky Rubio, whom the Minnesota Timberwolves drafted with the 
fifth overall pick in the 2009 NBA draft, began his professional basketball career at age fourteen, when 
he played for Spain’s top professional team); David Waldstein, Family Ties Have Gallinari Feeling at 
Ease, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), June 28, 2008, at Sports 29 (noting that NBA player Danilo Gallinari began 
playing professional basketball in Italy as a fifteen-year-old). 
89 Tyler was born on June 1, 1991, meaning he would be nineteen years old by December 31, 
2010.  Players: Jeremy Tyler, NBA Draft.net, http://www.nbadraft.net/players/jeremy-tyler (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2010). 
90 Tyler will earn $140,000 a year playing in Israel.  Thamel, Prep Star, supra note 86.  As a 
likely top five pick in the NBA draft, Tyler would receive a guaranteed contract worth at least $7.65 
million.  Van Der Horst, supra note 80. 
91 See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School 
Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 169–73 (2004) (discussing the financial 
benefits for NBA players by accessing free agency as early as possible). 
92 See NBA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 6, art. X, § 1. 
93 Should it allow Tyler to enter the 2010 NBA draft, the NBA might motivate other superstar 
high school basketball players to drop out of high school prior to their senior year. 
94 See Craig F. Arcella, Major League Baseball’s Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial 
Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2420, 2460 (1997); see also Mélanie 
Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 189, 198 n.56 (2003) (noting the significance of the arbitrary and capricious standard for 
arbitration in MLB). 
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league’s application of its CBA to exclude him or her.95 
Alternatively, Tyler could simply challenge the legality of the NBA’s 
eligibility rule, with the rule then facing a similar core attack to that raised 
by Clarett, namely, that the NBA and NBPA cannot receive protection 
under the non-statutory labor exemption for rules that exclude prospective 
players. 
The venue of any lawsuit challenging the NBA’s eligibility rule would 
prove crucial.  A plaintiff would undoubtedly avoid the Second Circuit, 
where Clarett is controlling.  The NBA, in contrast, would attempt to 
transfer such a case to New York, where the league is headquartered and 
where the Second Circuit presides.  Assuming the NBA was unable to 
transfer the case, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Clarett would prove 
influential but not determinative.  Indeed, only the Second Circuit has 
addressed whether collective bargaining can insulate age limits from 
antitrust scrutiny; it is uncertain how another U.S. Court of Appeals would 
address the issue.96 
Wherever the claim is heard, a plaintiff challenging the NBA’s 
eligibility rule would gain a tactical advantage by distinguishing Clarett’s 
facts.  Most notably, unlike Maurice Clarett, who had to argue a 
hypothetical—what the NFL would be like without its eligibility rule—a 
player contesting the NBA’s eligibility rule could cite the generally 
favorable empirical evidence of players who matriculated to the NBA 
following their high school graduation.  Evidence suggests that this group 
of players, which includes Lebron James, Kevin Garnett, and other stars,97 
have performed well both on and off the court.98 
                                                                                                                          
95 Maurice Clarett, in contrast, challenged the legality of the NFL’s eligibility rule.  For a full 
discussion, see supra Part III. 
96 There is reason to believe, however, that a court which adopts the “Mackey Test” would be 
poised to hold in favor of a plaintiff who argues for a limited definition of the non-statutory labor 
exemption.  The Mackey Test, a product of Mackey v. NFL, dictates that the non-statutory exemption 
only applies if an alleged restraint—such as an eligibility restriction—satisfies the following three 
conditions: (1) it involves mandatory subjects of bargaining; (2) it primarily affects the parties 
involved; and (3) it is reached through “bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining.”  Mackey v. Nat’l Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).  The Mackey Test, which would likely dictate that an 
eligibility restriction neither involves mandatory subjects of bargaining nor primarily affects the parties, 
is good law in at least three circuits: the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit.  Marc 
Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement” Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports 
Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 416 n.90 (2009). 
97 In addition to James and Garnett, Kobe Bryant, Tracy McGrady, Dwight Howard, Jermaine 
O’Neal, Amare Stoudemire, Rashard Lewis, and Al Jefferson all skipped college and have enjoyed 
significant success in the NBA.  See Tony Mejia, The Top 100: James, Bryant Remain at the Head of 
the Class, PRO BASKETBALL NEWS, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.probasketballnews.com/story/ 
?storyid=709 (providing an expert’s ranking that includes the aforementioned players who jumped 
from high school to the NBA). 
98 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 91, at 169–73 (noting the increased total earning 
capacity of players who enter the NBA straight from high school); Morty Ain, The Spin: Teenage 
Wasteland, ESPN MAG., July 18, 2005, at 38 (noting that, as a group, players who skipped college and 
directly entered the NBA average more points, rebounds, and assists than the average NBA player or 
the average player of any other age cohort in the NBA); Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law 
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Should another circuit hold that the non-statutory labor exemption does 
not protect the NBA’s eligibility rule, the rule would then be subject to 
antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  As various writings 
detail, the rule would likely fail to satisfy the rigid requirements of section 
1.99  If so, an apparent “circuit split” between two federal circuits on the 
legality of leagues’ eligibility restrictions would emerge.  Such an outcome 
might attract the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court, and particularly 
Justice Sotomayor. 
B.  Antitrust Immunity for Professional Sports Leagues 
Justice Sotomayor’s writings and presence may also influence whether 
professional sports leagues are exempt from section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
Such an exemption lies at the heart of American Needle, a recent decision 
by the Seventh Circuit in which the NFL was granted single entity status 
for limited purposes.  The Supreme Court reviewed American Needle in its 
October 2009 term.100 
Before American Needle, independently-owned franchises in a 
professional sports league had typically been defined as entities engaged in 
a “joint venture.”101  A joint venture refers to an association of independent 
entities that collaborate in, and carry out, a single business venture for joint 
profit, for which purpose the entities combine their resources, skill, and 
knowledge.102  Teams, of course, necessarily collaborate in various ways 
(e.g., they agree on rules for games and the order of the draft), but with 
separate ownership groups and team identities, they remain distinctly 
independent and usually competitive (e.g., they try to defeat each other on 
Sundays and try to draft better players than other teams).  Crucially, joint 
                                                                                                                          
Blog, NBA Players That Get in Trouble with the Law: Do Age and Education Level Matter?, 
http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/07/nba-players-that-get-in-trouble-with_20.html (July 20, 2005, 
10:00 EST) (supplying empirical data that indicates that among NBA players there is a near inverse 
correlation between number of years spent in college and propensity to being arrested). 
99 See, e.g., Edelman & Doyle, supra note 96, at 424–28 (analyzing age requirements under the 
Sherman Act); McCann & Rosen, supra note 42, at 734–40 (discussing the applicability of the 
Sherman Act to NFL and NBA eligibility rules); Nicholas E. Wurth, The Legality of an Age-
Requirement in the National Basketball League After the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 
3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 134 (2005) (stating that courts could find a basis for an 
antitrust claim against the NBA’s age requirement rule). 
100 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  I discuss American Needle in detail in a separate 
piece in the Yale Law Journal.  See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to 
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726 (2010).  For purposes of this Essay, I offer a highly condensed 
description. 
101 See Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 
1992) (characterizing the NBA as a “joint venture”); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (characterizing the NFL as a “joint venture”). 
102 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2009); see Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic 
Alliances and Corporate Control, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 867–72 (2003) (discussing the 
business purposes of joint ventures). 
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ventures are subject to section 1 and normally “rule of reason” analysis.103  
Under the rule of reason, courts assess the extent to which a joint venture 
deprives the marketplace of the independent decision making normally 
demanded by competition and, conversely, the extent to which the joint 
venture improves market efficiencies.104 
In American Needle, the Seventh Circuit held that in certain settings of 
collusive behavior,105 a professional sports league and its independently-
owned franchises may function as a single entity instead of as a joint 
venture.106  The primary significance of single entity status is that it 
exempts the league and its franchises from scrutiny under section 1.107  
Here is why: as a single entity, they are thought to share a “corporate 
consciousness” making them one, as opposed to merely distinct entities 
engaged in a joint venture.108  From enhanced autonomy in business 
operations to mitigation of litigation costs, an exemption from section 1 
offers enormous value to professional leagues and their franchises.109  The 
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion endorsed a viewpoint rejected by other 
courts.110 
My publication in the Yale Law Journal, titled American Needle v. 
NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, assesses the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding and describes what I consider to be its favorable and 
                                                                                                                          
103 Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388–90 (9th Cir. 1984). 
104 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–91 (1978) (describing the 
evolution of the rule of reason and explaining its focus on the competitive significance of a restraint); 
see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs 
to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 278–80 (1986) (discussing application of the rule of 
reason to market efficiency claims); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 80 (2003) (applying the rule of reason to price variations among industries). 
105 The specific setting in American Needle concerned NFL apparel sales, specifically Reebok 
receiving an exclusive contract for apparel bearing the NFL’s logos and trademarks.  American Needle, 
another apparel company, reasoned that an exclusive contract between teams which are ostensibly 
competitors and which preserve their individual franchise interests in those same logos and trademarks 
violates section 1.  Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. 
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-661).  The Seventh Circuit exempted the NFL 
from violating section 1 in its apparel sales, reasoning that teams voluntarily assign the licensing of 
their logos and trademarks to the league-controlled NFL Properties.  Thus, for purposes of selling 
apparel, teams share corporate consciousness, meaning they cannot be expected to compete.  Id. at 744. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
109 To illustrate, consider the substantial resources leagues tend to expend when defending section 
1 lawsuits.  The NFL, for instance, is said to have spent nearly $50 million in legal fees and settlement 
costs in its section 1 litigation with the Raiders.  Marc D. Oram, The Stadium Financing and Franchise 
Relocation Act of 1999, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 184, 190 (2000) (discussing Los Angeles Memorial 
Coliseum Commission). 
110 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that 
NFL teams compete off the field and are thus not a single entity); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n, 726 
F.2d at 1390 (finding that the NFL is not a single entity under section 1); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys 
Football Club, Ltd., 1998 WL 419765, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (declining to recognize the NFL as a 
single entity). 
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detrimental qualities.111  A principle concern relates to uncertainty as to 
whether, and when, other leagues and other league activities might enjoy 
single entity status.  Save for implying that labor matters would be 
inappropriate for single entity treatment,112 the Seventh Circuit, without 
much guidance, suggested that courts should address the merits of leagues’ 
proposed single entity defenses on an ad hoc basis.113  This ambiguity 
opens the door for uncertain applications. 
When the Supreme Court reviews American Needle, Justice 
Sotomayor’s skepticism of unilateral league maneuvers, as displayed in 
Silverman, may not bode well for the NFL, or, by implication, similarly 
situated leagues.114  Indeed, in Silverman, she repeatedly highlighted the 
importance of bargaining between the league and its players as crucial for 
the protection of legal rights.115  Such a viewpoint builds on the Seventh 
Circuit’s suggestion in American Needle that single entity status would be 
unfitting in labor matters.116 
Then again, in Clarett, Justice Sotomayor highlighted that multi-
employer bargaining depends on teams’ capacity to “band together to act 
as a single entity in bargaining with a common union.”117  Indeed, such a 
viewpoint may have contributed to Sotomayor’s expansive interpretation 
of the non-statutory exemption: in order to protect the legal interests of 
owners, owners need to band together as a unitary entity—even if 
individual owners might prefer to behave differently (e.g., certain NFL 
teams desired an opportunity to draft Clarett before he satisfied the NFL’s 
eligibility rule, but those teams, and other NFL teams, agreed that the NFL 
would be better off with Clarett satisfying the rule). 
Furthermore, in other opinions, Justice Sotomayor has recognized 
single entity status for organizations that bear some similarities to 
professional sports leagues.  In Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, for 
                                                                                                                          
111 McCann, American Needle v. NFL, supra note 100. 
112 American Needle, 538 F.3d at 741 (“[I]ndividuals seeking employment with any of the 
league’s teams would view the league as a collection of loosely affiliated companies that all have the 
independent authority to hire and fire employees.”). 
113 Id. at 742. 
114 See supra Part II (discussing then-Judge Sotomayor’s critique of a new set of employment 
terms that MLB had unilaterally imposed).  Additional insight may be gained from Major League 
Baseball Properties v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).  Salvino involved an analogous fact 
pattern to American Needle in that it considered the joint licensing activities of Major League Baseball 
Properties (“MLBP”) under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Although MLBP did not assert the single 
entity defense, the opinion seems relevant insofar as then-Judge Sotomayor argued that MLBP should 
be reviewed as a joint venture under a rule of reason analysis.  Id. at 338–39.  The opinion therefore 
suggests that Justice Sotomayor may be inclined to reject the characterization of the NFL as a single 
entity. 
115 Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 255–56 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
116 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
117 Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 
684, 688 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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instance, then-Judge Sotomayor characterized a national bank and its 
branches as a single entity.118  She justified such a status on federal 
banking law and the “practical realities of branch banking.”119 
It is unclear whether the “practical realities” of a professional sports 
league operation would procure a similar interpretation, though there are 
crucial differences between operating a professional sports league and 
engaging in branch banking.  Namely, while professional sports leagues 
typically feature individually-owned franchises, branch banking refers to a 
multiple-office structure in which one bank owns and operates all of the 
banking offices.120  From another point of view, however, while branches 
are geographically positioned to avoid competing with one another, they, 
like professional sports franchises, “compete” in the sense that the bank 
may close underperforming branches.121  These and other considerations 
might provide for engaging fodder when the Supreme Court, with Justice 
Sotomayor as its newest member, examines the relationship between single 
entity status and professional sports leagues. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Silverman and Clarett are merely two examples of Justice Sotomayor’s 
extensive body of jurisprudence.  Yet they furnish important insights into 
her judicial philosophy.  Foremost, they belie commentators who disparage 
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning as subsumed by subjective considerations.  
Indeed, they suggest that she embraces a substantive and fairly 
conventional approach to jurisprudence, even to the detriment of the most 
disadvantaged or vulnerable party. 
Silverman and Clarett are also two of the most influential opinions in 
contemporary sports law.  To the chagrin of some, they interpret the non-
statutory labor exemption as decidedly protective of league policies borne 
                                                                                                                          
118 Greenbaum v. Handlesbanken, 26 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  It should be noted 
that this case did not concern application of the Sherman Act, but rather the availability of punitive 
damages.  Id. at 651. 
119 Id. at 654 (stating that for branches to avoid various forms of liability, a national bank must be 
able to limit its responsibilities to one bank at a time). 
120 See Joann Senzel Nestor, Interstate Branch Banking Reform: Preserving the Policies 
Underlying the McFadden Act, 72 B.U. L. REV. 607, 614–16 (1992) (describing the ownership 
structure of branch banking).  A better professional sports league analogy to branch banking would be 
Major League Soccer, which is organized as one corporation, with the corporation owning the league’s 
fourteen franchises and centrally planning all broadcasting rights, licensing, and merchandising.  See 
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56–58 (1st Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether Major 
League Soccer is a single entity). 
121 See Ethan W. Johnson, Reducing Liability of American Banks for Expropriated Foreign 
Branch Deposits, 34 EMORY L.J. 201, 223 (1985) (noting that banks close branches for business 
reasons).  But see Stacey Stritzel, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994: Progress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 187–
88 (1995) (describing limitations imposed by federal law on autonomy of banks to close branches in 
low-income areas). 
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from collective bargaining.  Though such an interpretation supplies bright-
line certainty to league-player bargaining, it also invites critique as overly-
expansive and rigid. 
Lastly, Silverman and Clarett illuminate how Justice Sotomayor may 
continue to play a leading role in shaping sports law.  In the near future, 
the NBA eligibility restriction is poised to trigger a “Clarett-like” case, 
which could culminate in a Supreme Court review of professional sports 
eligibility rules.  In American Needle, the Supreme Court is already 
reviewing a more sweeping matter: whether leagues and franchises may 
define themselves as single entities.  Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in 
Silverman and Clarett, along with her viewpoints from other opinions, 
suggest she will balance her concern for unilateral league behavior with 
her appreciation for the pragmatic necessities of league operation. 
